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THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING HALE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 11. 
The State at times seems to be contending that the 2003 amendment of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a), which replaced language indicating that withdrawal of guilty pleas 
required proof of good cause, with language indicating that withdrawal of guilty pleas 
requires proof that the pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made, now forecloses 
arguments that pleas were not taken in strict compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11. See 
State's brief at 12-17. 
In making this argument, the State relies primarily on habeas cases, such as Salazar 
v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993); Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, 88 P.3d 
353; and Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989). See State's brief at 12-17. 
Reliance on the habeas cases for the proposition that there is no longer a strict Rule 
11 compliance test is questionable, as courts normally require proof of constitutional 
violations in habeas cases, and habeas cases are thus viewed as procedurally inapposite to 
direct appeals. See, e ^ , State v. Lehl 2003 UT App 212,19 n.3, 73 P.3d 985 (noting 
that in Salazar, 892 P.2d at 991 n.6, the court went outside the record of the plea hearing 
in searching for a constitutional violation, because it was a habeas case, rather than a 
direct appeal challenge to a violation of Rule 11). 
However, the State also seems to acknowledge, in citing State v. Corwell 2005 
UT 28, 113 P.3d 569, that the Rule 11 strict compliance test is still in effect. See State's 
brief at 12, 16, 18. 
While Corwell does apply the strict compliance test, because Corwell does not 
directly address the continuing vitality of the strict compliance test after the 2003 
amendment to 77-13-6, and because Corwell involved a plea that was entered and then 
attempted to be withdrawn prior to the amendment of 77-13-6, Corwell does not 
necessarily establish that the strict compliance test continues to apply on direct appeal. 
The rule requiring strict compliance with Rule 11 has been the law in Utah for 
years, and is designed to insure that guilty pleas are knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
See, e ^ , State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). Utah R. Crim. P. 11 continues to 
require trial courts to conduct thorough inquiries in taking pleas. See, id. Because none 
of the controlling cases requiring strict compliance with Rule 11 has been expressly 
2 
overruled, see, e ^ , State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (requiring strict 
compliance with Rule 11), and State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, 69 P.3d 838 (same), and 
because the State has not justified the extreme measure of overruling this huge and 
enduring body of law, this Court should continue to adhere to those precedents. See, e.g.. 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (explaining vertical and horizontal stare 
decisis, which respectively requires this Court to follow precedents from the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court). 
Because Hale establishes constitutional violations in the entry of his pleas, 
see discussion infra, this Court need not address the issue of the Rule 11 strict compliance 
test in Hale's case in any event. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PLEA 
LACKED A FACTUAL BASIS, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT HALE UNDERSTOOD THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OR THE LAW 
IN RELATION TO THE FACTS. 
Despite the fact that the plea affidavit and plea colloquy omitted the key elements 
of intent to cause serious bodily injury, and causation of serious bodily injury, the State 
contends that Hale understood the elements of aggravated assault, because Hale's lawyer 
said he had looked at the statute, and mentioned intent to cause serious bodily injury in 
discussing the filing of an amended information, because the plea form indicated Hale's 
opinion that Hale understood the elements of the offenses pled to, and because Hale had 
consulted with and indicated satisfaction with his lawyer, who also indicated orally and in 
writing that Hale's entry of the plea was proper. State's brief at 19-21. 
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This Court should reject the State's arguments, because when trial counsel was 
discussing the amended information, he did not identify intent to cause serious bodily 
injury as an element, and the entire oral discussion of the anticipated amendment of the 
information was undoubtedly quite confusing for anyone in the courtroom to understand.1 
When trial counsel wrote the elements in the plea form and then addressed them 
orally in court, he made record of the facts that either he himself did not understand the 
legal elements of aggravated assault, or that he knew there was no factual basis for the 
plea to satisfy the true elements and thus did not articulate the true legal definition of the 
offense or factual basis.2 
lThe prosecutor indicated that he would file an amended information after the 
entry of the plea (R. 106: 2). The amended information was not actually filed until 
February 17, three days after the entry of the plea (R. 23). 
The discussion concerning the anticipated amended information was lengthy (R. 
106: 2-4), and is included in Addendum C to the State's brief. 
2
 The plea form stated the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or not contest) 
are: 
- enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft 
- commit an assault as defined in 76-5-102 and causes serious bodily injury to 
another[.] 
(R. 18 (back side)). 
The plea form stated the following with regard to the factual basis for the pleas: 
- entered a motor home to commit a theft; 
got into an altercation with an individual, causing a torn rotator cuff and a 
broken elbow[.] 
(R. 19). 
During the plea colloquy, trial counsel stated the following factual basis: 
Mr. Hale entered a motor home which technically under the case law 
qualifies as a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft, and upon leaving 
4 
Moreover, tl: le ii lforn lation i isecl cli n irig the plea hear ing d i d i lot state 01 define the 
el.em.ents of aggravated, assai ill, but merely iih* , ^  a b\ interlineation tl mt 1 lale was 
pleading guilty to aggravated assault, a second degree felony, under 76-5-103 (R. 1-5). It 
was not until three days after the entry of the plea that an amended information was filed 
(R. 23). 
The State relies on the probable cause statement in the hand-amended information 
for proof of Ha l e ' s knowledge of the factual basis for the aggravated assault plea. State 's 
brief at 21 
By reviewing 1 1. le I lai id a..i i lei ided ii lfon i lation in tl ie I eo 31 d ai id ii 1 A dciei idi in 1 B to 
the State's brief, this Court can readily confirm that the probable cause statement relied 
on is the original one pertaining to the original offenses, which did not include a charge of 
aggravated assault. See R 1 5 1. 1 ic pi obable cause statei 1 lei it ii 1. tl ie or iginal information 
was not amended in any way prior to the entry of the plea after the charge of aggravated 
assault was added, and thus, it provided no notice to Hale that the factual basis for the 
added charge would necessarily be accurately reflected in the probable cause statement. 
SeeR, 1-5. 
The best pieces of evidence of Hale's understanding of the legal elements and 
the motor home was confronted by the owner. An altercation ensued during 
which the owner suffered a torn rotator cuff and broken elbow. 
(R. 106 at 5-6). 
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factual basis are the portions of the plea form and plea colloquy, both of which 
specifically and incorrectly state the elements and factual basis required for the 
aggravated assault plea. Cf. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988) (citing 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 470 (1969), for the propositions that 
defendant must have an understanding of the relationship between the law and the facts in 
order to enter a voluntary plea and that "there is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
in the record at the time the plea was entered the defendant's understanding of the nature 
of the charge against him.") (emphasis by McCarthy Court). See also State v. Gentry, 797 
P.2d 456,459 (Utah App. 1990) (Court refused to infer defendant's understanding of the 
nature and elements of the offense from his presence at trial which preceded entry of 
plea). 
While the State would have this Court go outside the plea colloquy to establish 
Hale's understanding of the legal elements and factual basis for the plea, State's brief at 
12-24, the State does not want the Court to consider the victim's letter to the trial court 
and to the presentence investigator, both of which confirm that Hale did not commit an 
aggravated assault, because the victim describes the injury as occurring when Hale fell on 
top of him during a scuffle (demonstrating that the injury was not intentionally caused), 
and that the victim's injury is not permanent and thus is not legally "serious." (R. 106 at 
62 R. 96-105). State's brief at 24-25. 
The trial court was in possession of both of these documents prior to denying Mr. 
6 
Hale's motion to withdraw his plea i ;\ 106 at 23-24). I he trial court should have 
recognized tl: lat tl lese doci n i lei its < - ' -• id establisl i w 1 lat till. it s plea foi i i l ai id colloqi ly 
do - that there was no factual basis to satisfy the legal elements of the aggravated assault 
plea. It is thus entirely fair for this Court to consider the facts as stated by the victim 
himself in weighing whethei the ti ial coi ii: t abi ised its discretic i l in dei i;> ing I lale's 
motion to withdraw the plea. Cf. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991) 
(appellate court may use properly incorporated presentence report to establish compliance 
with Rule 11) While the State would have the Court speculate that the victim's 
descriptions were "prob.ibh mHMiipIrl" tin! flut tlih. "I JIIII h nilJ tch inshMil i n Iho 
probable cause statement in the hand-amended information, State's brief at 24, the 
likelihood is that the victim was in a far better position to know what happened in the 
altercation wi . Hale, and the extent of his injuries, than wa<* the «>i *kvi w ho signed 
!(!
- *.»l int. • :=.- . i,, ii idicatii lg tl lat the probable cai ise state *M ^ - - < ^nr* . n 
of unidentified police reports and witness statements (R. 27-28). See id. 
Assuming arguendo that the State is correct that Hale must establish a 
constitutional, as opposed to - -ficiency ii i tl ic ei it! y of 1 lis plea , he 1 las done so, 
for constitutional law has long recognized that pleas cannot be knowing and voluntary 
and comport with the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions if the 
record does not demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses t< ) w 1 licl 11 .< • p led See, e,g„ State v. Breckenridge, 688 I ]l" 2d 1 10, 4 13 44 t ; n i< 11 i ,2 
7 
(Utah 1983) (pleas are not constitutionally voluntary unless the record of plea entry 
reflects defendant's accurate understanding of the nature and elements of the offense, 
especially the necessary mens red); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988) 
(plea is not constitutionally voluntary if defendant does not understand the nature of the 
charge). 
C. THE BURGLARY CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED. 
1. HALE DID NOT WAIVE THE ISSUE BY ENTERING HIS PLEA. 
The State claims that Hale's entry of his guilty plea waived all issues pertaining to 
whether his conduct amounted to second degree felony burglary of a dwelling or class A 
misdemeanor vehicle burglary, because guilty pleas are considered to waive all non-
jurisdictional defects. State's brief at 25-29. 
The issue which Hale raises, and which the State has failed to address, is that 
Hale's plea to burglary was involuntary because he was not informed prior to the entry of 
his plea that his conduct did not constitute second degree burglary, but instead, 
constituted class A misdemeanor vehicle burglary. See Hale's opening brief at 15, citing 
R. 36-52. 
Claims of involuntarily entered pleas and ineffective assistance in the entry of 
those pleas survive the entry of those pleas. See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT 
App 203, ^  8-11, 73 P.3d 967 (affirmative misrepresentation of deportation consequence 
of pleas by counsel which caused defendant to enter guilty plea constituted ineffective 
8 
assistance of counsel and justified withdrawal of the pleas); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1273-74 (Utah 1988) (plea is not constitutionally voluntary if defendant does not 
understand the sentencing consequences or if it was entered on the basis of illusory 
promises). 
Courts recognize that a guilty plea is not properly counseled and voluntary unless 
the defendant understands the relationship of the law and the facts. Duran v. Cook, 788 
P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443-
444 and n.2 (Utah 1983) (pleas are not constitutionally voluntary unless the record of plea 
entry reflects defendant's accurate understanding of the nature and elements of the 
offense); State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988) (plea is not 
constitutionally voluntary if defendant does not understand the nature of the charge). 
A guilty plea entered upon the advice of counsel is invalid if the plea was 
coerced, or if the advice of defendant's counsel was not within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases[.] [W]hile an 
erroneous sentence estimate does not render a plea involuntary, if an 
attorney "unfairly holds out an assurance of leniency in exchange for a 
confession of guilt, the question may arise whether such assurances were 
coercive." 
United States v. Russell 2001 WL 121956 (citations omitted). 
Because Hale's guilty pleas were not properly counseled or premised on a correct 
statement of the legal elements of the offenses, they were unknowing and involuntary, 
and the trial court thus should have permitted their withdrawal. See id. 
2. THE BURGLARY PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE HALE WAS NOT 
PROPERLY ADVISED REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF VEHICLE BURGLARY 
9 
OR THE BURGLARY TO WHICH HE PLED. 
The State contends that two offenses must be identical in order to qualify for 
treatment under the Shondel doctrine, and that the second degree burglary statute was 
more specific than the vehicle burglary statute, and thus was the applicable statute under 
State v. Lowden 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994). State's brief at 31-36. 
Assuming that the State's arguments are correct, they still do not refute Hale's 
claims that had Hale been properly advised concerning the elements of the charged 
offenses and vehicle burglary and concerning his defenses, Hale would have gone to trial 
and let the jury decide whether the State had proof that the motor home that was parked in 
the driveway of a residence met the elements of second degree burglary as identified by 
the State in its brief, particularly the elements requiring proof that the vehicle was adapted 
for overnight accommodations of persons and is usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night. Compare State's brief at 32 with Hale's brief at 8 at 15; and R. 36-52, 
68-69, R. 105: 24-39 (arguing that Hale's plea was involuntary and that he would have 
proceeded to trial had he been advised by trial counsel concerning the elements of the 
offenses to which he pled, and his defenses to the charges). 
The State identifies five elements of second degree burglary: 
1. that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in 
2. a vehicle 
3. adapted for overnight accommodations of persons 
4. which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night 
5. with intent to commit a theft. 
10 
State's brief at 32. 
This confirms that Hale was not properly advised and that Hale's plea was 
involuntary, as the elements of the offense identified during the plea hearing were 
incomplete. The plea form stated the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or not contest) 
are: 
- enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft [.] 
(R. 18 (back side)). 
This confirms that under cases such as Copeland, Breckenridge, supra, the trial 
court should have permitted Hale to withdraw his plea to burglary. See id. 
C. HALE'S INTOXICATION JUSTIFIES WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS. 
The State claims that there is nothing in the record to indicate that Hale informed 
his trial lawyer that he was intoxicated during the alleged offenses. State's brief at 38-41. 
Hale's pleadings assert that his first trial lawyer, Stephen Howard, failed to 
investigate and prepare a defense, and failed to assert the defense of intoxication, as Hale 
was extremely intoxicated (R. 42, 50), that Hale "made counsel aware of all the facts that 
he could, consistent with what counsel addressed with him, and what [counsel] would 
allow Hale to express" (R. 48). Hale argued that trial counsel did not inform Hale that his 
intoxication was a legal defense to the charged offenses (e.g. R. 36-52). 
Assuming that the foregoing does not establish that trial counsel was aware of 
Hale's intoxication, trial counsel should nonetheless be held responsible, for it is the trial 
11 
lawyer's unequivocal and objectively reasonable duty to investigate the fundamental facts 
of the case. See, e ^ , State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 187-88 and n.25 (Utah 1990) 
(holding that Strickland puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of trial lawyers to make 
reasonable investigations into the underlying facts of a case, and potential defense 
witnesses). 
The State argues that trial counsel had no reason to suspect Hale's intoxication 
because the facts alleged in the probable cause statement and in the victim's statement 
show that Hale intended to commit a theft while inside the motor home, and because the 
probable cause statement demonstrates that his assault on the victim was intentional. 
State's brief at 39-40. 
As a factual matter, the victim's statements, which reflect that his injury was 
caused when Hale fell on top of him during a scuffle, demonstrate that the injury was not 
intentionally inflicted by Hale, but inferentially may have been the direct result of 
intoxication (R. 106 at 62 R. 96-105). 
One of the original charges against Hale was possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 
4). This fact suggests that a competent trial lawyer might have inquired into Hale's 
potential intoxication at the time of the offense. 
As a legal matter, in our adversarial system, defense lawyers are not free to take 
the State's or complaining witnesses' allegations at face value. Rather, they must 
investigate the fundamental facts of the case and potential defense witnesses. See, e.g.. 
12 
Templin, supra. Competent counsel should have investigated Hale's intoxication and 
advised him of this potential defense. See id-
The State argues that Hale was not prejudiced, because the evidence against him 
on the original charges was strong, and the only thing indicating he would have gone to 
trial is his own "self serving" statement. State's brief at 41-42. 
If this Court will review the original information, which is in Addendum B to the 
State's brief, the Court may confirm that the original aggravated burglary charge was 
premised on the theory that Hale entered or remained inside the motor home with the 
intent to commit an assault (R. 1). This charge would have been very difficult to prove, 
even under the facts alleged in the probable cause statement, which reflects that there was 
never anyone inside the motor home but Hale, and that Hale's altercation with the victim 
occurred outside the motor home only after the victim tried to slam the motor home door 
shut when Hale tried to exit (R. 4), thus countering the notion that Hale entered or 
remained inside the motor home with the intent to commit an assault. 
The seven counts of theft by receiving, charged against Hale and his co-defendant, 
Mari D. Labine, were premised on the theory that the co-defendants "received, retained or 
disposed of the property" of Terry Ford, the owner of the motor home, knowing that the 
property had been stolen. These counts were likewise weak, because there was no 
evidence that Hale ever took any of Ford's property out of the motor home, and even if he 
had, these seven counts should have been consolidated into one under the single larceny 
13 
doctrine. See State v. Barker. 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981) (property taken from one 
location, even from multiple owners, constitutes one offense under the single larceny 
doctrine). 
It actually appears that the information was poorly drafted, and that the theft by 
receiving counts should have been premised on the stolen property found in Mari 
Labine's car. The probable cause statement reflects Labine's admission that she knew the 
property in her car was stolen, but does nothing to establish that Hale had this knowledge, 
or anything to do with the property in her car (R. 5). Thus, the State would have been 
hard pressed to prove constructive possession by Hale. See, e.g.. State v. Workman. 2005 
UT 66, Tflf 31-33, 122 P.3d 639 (to establish constructive possession, government must 
show nexus between defendant and item at issue, must demonstrate intent and power to 
exercise dominion). 
The final count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia is premised on a box 
of drug ingestion tools found in Marie Labine's car (R. 5). Again, the probable cause 
statement is devoid of any indication that the government had any evidence that Hale 
constructively possessed or had anything to do with that box in Labine's car, to sustain 
that charge against him. See, e.g.. Workman, supra. 
This quick perusal of the charges and State's summary of its evidence against Hale 
in the probable cause statement demonstrates that Hale had a very triable case. His 
repeated and detailed and meritorious arguments to the Court that he would have gone to 
14 
trial had he been properly advised by his trial counsel thus establish prejudice. See, e.g.. 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 22, 95 P.3d 276 (defendant shows prejudice from 
objectively deficient performance by counsel in the entry of a guilty plea if the record 
shows that in the absence of the trial lawyer's deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have gone to trial). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FULLY INVESTIGATE 
AND CURE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HALE AND GARCIA 
FURTHER JUSTIFIES WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS 
AND REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
The State argues that there was no error in the trial court's refusal to replace 
Manny Garcia, because the court conducted sufficient inquiry into the conflict between 
Hale and Garcia. State's brief at 44-48. 
Hale's argument that the trial court's inquiry was deficient and constituted per se 
error is premised on the facts that at the first hearing, the trial court permitted Garcia to 
repeatedly interrupt Hale as Hale tried to explain the conflict to the court (R. 106 at 12-
20), and then at the second hearing, the court confirmed with Hale and Garcia that they 
had "had some differences in how the case should be defended under these 
circumstances," but did not inquire into the specifics of the conflict (R. 106 at 22). See 
State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987) (requiring trial courts to make 
meaningful inquiry into facts underlying conflicts between appointed lawyers and their 
clients, even if the courts believe the clients are trying to manipulate the system). 
15 
The State contends that the trial court did not err in refusing to replace Garcia, 
because Hale's claims were frivolous. State's brief at 48-50. 
Hale's claims were not frivolous. Review of the original charging information 
demonstrates that the original charges against Hale were lacking in legal merit and would 
have been very triable.3 
3As discussed above, the original aggravated burglary charge was premised on the 
theory that Hale entered or remained inside the motor home with the intent to commit an 
assault (R. 1). This charge would have been very difficult to prove, even under the facts 
alleged in the probable cause statement, which reflects that there was never anyone inside 
the motor home but Hale, and that Hale's altercation with the victim occurred only after 
the victim tried to slam the motor home door shut when Hale tried to exit (R. 4), thus 
countering the notion that Hale entered or remained inside the motor home with the intent 
to commit an assault. 
The seven counts of theft by receiving, charged against Hale and his co-defendant, 
Mari D. Labine, were premised on the theory that the co-defendants "received, retained or 
disposed of the property" of Terry Ford, the owner of the motor home, knowing that the 
property had been stolen. These counts were likewise weak, because there was no 
evidence that Hale ever took any of Ford's property out of the motor home, and even if he 
had, these seven counts should have been consolidated into one under the single larceny 
doctrine. See State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981) (property taken from one 
location, even from multiple owners, constitutes one offense under the single larceny 
doctrine). 
It actually appears that the information was poorly drafted, and that the theft by 
receiving counts should have been premised on the stolen property found in Mari 
Labine's car. The probable cause statement reflects Labine's admission that she knew the 
property in her car was stolen, but does nothing to establish that Hale had this knowledge, 
or anything to do with the property in her car (R. 5). Thus, the State would have been 
hard pressed to prove constructive possession by Hale. See, e.g.. State v. Workman, 2005 
UT 66, fflf 31-33, 122 P.3d 639 (to establish constructive possession, government must 
show nexus between defendant and item at issue, must demonstrate intent and power to 
exercise dominion). 
The final count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia is premised on a box 
of drug ingestion tools found in Marie Labine's car (R. 5). Again, the probable cause 
statement is devoid of any indication that the government had any evidence that Hale 
constructively possessed or had anything to do with that box in Labine's cetr to sustain 
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Hale correctly argued that his plea was entered in violation of the constitutions and 
Rule 11, where the elements of both charges were identified incorrectly, thus making a 
record of his misunderstanding of the law and the facts essential to the voluntary and 
knowing entry of the pleas.4 See, e.g., Breckenridge and Copeland, supra. 
Had Hale been informed of an given an opportunity to prove his intoxication, a 
that charge against him. See, e ^ , Workman, supra. 
4The State recognizes that the aggravated assault charge requires proof of the 
elements of intentional causation of serious bodily injury. State's brief at 17. The State 
identifies five elements of second degree burglary: 
1. that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in 
2. a vehicle 
3. adapted for overnight accommodations of persons 
4. which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night 
5. with intent to commit a theft. 
State's brief at 32. 
The plea form stated the following with regard to the elements: 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or not contest) 
are: 
- enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft 
- commit an assault as defined in 76-5-102 and causes serious bodily injury to 
another [.] 
(R. 18 (back side)). 
The plea form stated the following with regard to the factual basis for the pleas: 
- entered a motor home to commit a theft; 
got into an altercation with an individual, causing a torn rotator cuff and a 
broken elbow[.] 
(R. 19). 
During the plea colloquy, trial counsel stated the following factual basis: 
Mr. Hale entered a motor home which technically under the case law 
qualifies as a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft, and upon leaving 
the motor home was confronted by the owner. An altercation ensued during 
which the owner suffered a torn rotator cuff and broken elbow. 
(R. 106 at 5-6). 
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jury may well have acquitted him of the original charges, and particularly given the total 
absence of any intent by Hale in entering or remaining in the motor home to commit an 
assault (R. 1), a jury may well have convicted him of the lesser included offense of 
vehicle burglary, a Class A misdemeanor. 
Hale's claims thus were not frivolous, but should be properly litigated by 
competent, conflict-free and committed counsel. See, e ^ , State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 
524, 533-34 (Utah App. 1997); Pursifell supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Hale's convictions and remand this matter to the 
trial court for withdrawal of his pleas. 
Respectfully submitted on June I, 2006. 
Elizal 
Attorney for Mr. Hale 
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